Alien Hallway 2
Long time passed since the alien invasion to our home planet. Earth resources are almost gone, so humanity has to explore other planets to survive... M.A.G.M.A. corporation, known from other games of the series, takes part in this activity, having successfully colonized several planets. The main source of income from these planets is Magmatite - the mineral of the future which gives colossal energy. For an unknown reason we lost communication with one of the distant planets. You - as an assault squad commander - need to find our what happened to the colony and to restore Magmatite mining... We're happy to present a new game in the Alien Shooter universe! Get prepared to unique tactical gameplay, lots of monster types and 8 fighter types allowing you create your own style of completing missions and defeating bosses. Gather resources during the fight and use them to add new soldiers. Form your current squad wisely, depending on the situation.
Alien Hallway 2
Your mission is to lead the troops consisting of Space Marines to take on the other side of the hall, which is naturally, full of aliens. You must take down the base of the aliens before they attack you in the same way.
"A man with a blue shirt walking through a dark hallway, in the style of Blade Runner 2049" Well, it apparently thinks I just want the hallway lighting to be blue, which is a pretty common sort of thing for it. Otherwise seems at least kind of Blade Runner-esque?
On June 3, 1993, less than a year after he entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident ("LPR"), Gonzalez-Roque was arrested and subsequently indicted on charges of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and robbery in the third degree, arising out of an incident which was alleged to have occurred in the early morning hours of June 3, 1993, when a building employee outside the apartment in which Gonzalez-Roque was staying told him to stop placing magazines in the hallway of the building and Gonzalez-Roque used a firearm to strike the building employee in the head and to shoot him four times, striking him once in the groin.
On October 5, 1994, deportation proceedings were commenced against Gonzalez-Roque, and the first deportation hearing was held on February 2, 1995 before Immigration Judge Joe Miller. At the hearing, Gonzalez-Roque stated that he wanted to represent himself. The Immigration Judge then questioned Gonzalez-Roque, who admitted that: (1) he was not a citizen of the United States; (2) he entered the United States as an LPR on August 3, 1992; and (3) he had been convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in 1993. The Immigration Judge therefore found that Gonzalez-Roque was a deportable alien.
United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d at 376 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838, 107 S. Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772). See generally Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993) ("It is well-established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.").
Section 1326(d) in effect thus codified the holding of the Supreme Court in Mendoza-Lopez, supra, 481 U.S. 828, 838, 107 S. Ct. 2148, 95 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1987), which held that a disposition in a deportation hearing cannot be used "to establish conclusively an element of a criminal offense" unless that disposition was subject to judicial review. If defects in a deportation proceeding "effectively eliminated the right of the alien to obtain [direct] judicial review," that deportation proceeding may be attacked collaterally in any subsequent proceeding that uses the deportation to establish an element of a criminal offense such as a trial under 8 U.S.C. 1326. Id. at 838-39, 107 S. Ct. 2148. See United States v. Sanchez-Peralta, 1998 WL 63405 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.13, 1998) ("Section 1326(d) appears, at least in part, to codify the constitutional standards governing collateral attacks established in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez.").
Contrary to Gonzalez-Roque's contention concerning the BIA appeal, there are authorities to the effect that the issue to be exhausted must be raised. Cortez-Acosta v. INS, 234 F.3d 476, 480 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Vargas v. U.S. Dep't of *583 Immigration & Naturalization, 831 F.2d 906, 907-08 (9th Cir.1987)). In Cortez-Acosta, the defendant argued to the Immigration Judge who conducted his deportation hearing that (1) he did not assist in the smuggling of illegal aliens; and (2) he maintained a domicile in the United States. The Immigration Judge rejected the defendant's claims and ordered him deported. The defendant appealed to the BIA, but only on the first ground that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he assisted in alien smuggling. After the BIA dismissed his appeal, the defendant sought direct review in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where he tried to raise both of the issues that he had argued to the Immigration Judge, as well as an argument that he was deprived of due process. The Ninth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction over the due process and domicile claims because the defendant had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by first raising those issues with the BIA. Id. at 480 ("Mr. Cortez-Acosta's appeal to the BIA did not address his domicile or due process issues at all, so we are precluded from reviewing those aspects of the administrative determination"); see Vargas, 831 F.2d at 907-08 (defendant precluded from raising due process claim that the Immigration Judge's deportation order was based on an inaccurate criminal history record where his notice of appeal to the BIA only challenged the Immigration Judge's denial of a waiver of deportation); Jorge v. Hart, 1997 WL 531309 at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.28, 1997) (defendant could only raise issues on judicial review if they were first presented to the BIA).
Section 1326(d)'s second requirement is that the defendant show that the deportation proceedings improperly deprived him of the opportunity for judicial review. 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) (2). The BIA decided the Gonzalez-Roque appeal on November 4, 1996. On September 30, 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA, which altered the availability of judicial review of deportation orders against aliens convicted of criminal offenses. Because Gonzalez-Roque's deportation proceedings commenced before April 1, 1997 and the deportation order became administratively final after October 30, 1996, his case is governed by the transitional provisions of the IIRIRA. See Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir.1998). Those rules provided that "there shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in [certain sections of the code]." Henderson, supra, at 117, citing IIRIRA 309(c) (4) (G).
It is the government's contention that Gonzalez-Roque should have sought habeas corpus relief. However, in 1995 the right to seek collateral review through a writ of habeas corpus was not well-established, and opposed by the government. See Jorge v. Hart, 1997 WL 531309 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (Mukasey, J.) (declining to rule on the question of the court's subject matter jurisdiction because of the difficulty of resolving the issue of an alien's right to seek review through a petition for habeas corpus). It was not until recently, six years after Gonzalez-Roque's deportation hearing, that the Supreme Court finally answered the question of whether aliens may seek review of removal orders "in the Court of Appeals ... in the district court ... or not at all." See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 2268, 150 L. Ed. 2d 392, 2001 WL 703943 (U.S.); INS v. St. Cyr, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347, 2001 WL 703922 (U.S.). Until the Supreme Court's recent rulings, it was not clear even to skilled lawyers that Gonzalez-Roque had a right to file a writ of habeas corpus. It certainly was not known to him. Thus, his failure to file a habeas petition should not be deemed a failure to met his burden under 1326(d) (2).
In addition, Gonzalez-Roque was actually prejudiced by the due process violation, as there was a real possibility that he would have succeeded in obtaining an adjustment of status if his completed I-130 form had been presented to the Immigration Judge. In order to demonstrate actual prejudice, Gonzalez-Roque need not show that he would certainly have been granted relief. He need only show that there was a "reasonable likelihood" of obtaining discretionary relief. United States v. Sanchez-Peralta, 97 Cr. 536(LAP), 1998 WL 63405 at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1998) (unpublished decision) (holding that a "reasonable likelihood" exists whenever "an alien has a meaningful chance to attain the relief he seeks, not just where he stands a very strong chance of attaining such relief."); see also Rabiu v. INS, 41 F.3d 879, 882-83 (2d Cir.1994) ("In order ... to show that his attorney's failure to file [a 212(c) application] caused him actual prejudice, [the alien] must make a prima facie showing that he could have made a strong showing in support of his application."); United States v. Jimenez-Marmolejo, 104 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.1996) (to succeed in collateral attack on deportation order, defendant charged with illegal reentry is required only to show that he had "plausible grounds for relief," not that he would have been granted relief).
Gonzalez-Roque had contended that he was eligible for relief under 245(a). At the time of his deportation proceedings, a deportable alien was eligible for an adjustment of status under this section if he met the following requirements:
 Cf. Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1993) (when deportation proceeding violated alien's statutory or constitutional rights, deportation is fundamentally unfair and order can be vacated on direct appeal without showing of prejudice). 041b061a72